Tests are a building block of our modern education system. Many tests are highstake, such as admission, licensing, and certification tests, that can significantly change one's life trajectory. For this reason, ensuring fairness in educational tests is becoming an increasingly important problem. This paper concerns the issue of item preknowledge in educational tests due to item leakage. That is, a proportion of test takers have access to leaked items before a test is administrated, which leads to inflated performance on the set of leaked items. We develop methods for the simultaneous detection of cheating test takers and compromised items based on data from a single test administration, when both sets are completely unknown. Latent variable models are proposed for the modelling of (1) data consisting only of item-level binary scores and (2) data consisting of both item-level binary scores and response time, where the former is commonly available in paper-and-pencil tests and the latter is widely encountered in computerbased tests. The proposed model adds a latent class model component upon a factor model (also known as item response theory model) component, where the factor model component captures item response behavior driven by test takers' ability and the latent class model component captures item response behavior due to item preknowledge. We further propose a statistical decision framework, under which compound decision rules are developed that control local false discovery/nondiscovery rates. Statistical inference is carried out under a Bayesian framework. The proposed method is applied to data from a computer-based nonadaptive licensure assessment.
Introduction
Fairness in educational and other testing becomes an increasingly more important concern of test score producers and consumers. Several test cheating scandals happened in recent years, including the US college admissions scandal (Smith, 2019) and the UK English language test cheating scandal (UK National Audit Office, 2019) . In addition, item leakage of high-stake tests is not uncommon (e.g., Jaschik, 2019; Kyle, 2002; Rosenblatt, 2018; Strauss, 2016) .
Item pool plays an important role in most high-stake tests. In each test administration, questions are selected from the pool. Due to the high cost of creating and calibrating new items, questions in the item pool are typically used multiple times. This leads to the risk of item leakage, which is one of the most common threats to test security (Kingston & Clark, 2014) . A proportion of test takers may receive access to the leaked items before the test, possibly through a test preparation company, an online forum of test preparation, or some other channels. These test takers will benefit from item preknowledge in the test. One example is the GRE item leakage scandal in 2002. In that event, Educational Testing Service found that many students in certain countries were benefiting from websites showing live items of the GRE test. The proportions of beneficiaries and leaked items were so significant that the average scores on GRE verbal increased by 100 points (out of a full mark 800 points) in one country and 50 points in another (Kyle, 2002) . Following the terminology of Cizek and Wollack (2017) , in what follows, we refer to test takers who benefit from item preknowledge as cheaters and the corresponding items as compromised items.
The detection of item preknowledge has received much attention among quantitative researchers in education. Many methods have been proposed to solve this problem (e.g., Belov, 2013 Belov, , 2016 Romero, Riascos, & Jara, 2015; Shu, Henson, & Luecht, 2013; Sinharay, 2017a; van der Linden, 2009; van der Linden & Lewis, 2015) , and three edited volumes have been published, including Wollack and Fremer (2013) , Kingston and Clark (2014) , and Cizek and Wollack (2017) . However, there lacks a probabilistic model for item response data involving item preknowledge. In addition, no suitable statistical decision theory has been proposed for this problem where false decisions can sometimes result in serious consequences.
In this paper, we propose statistical methods for detecting item preknowledge in tests, where both the cheaters and the compromised items are not known a priori. In particular, we propose statistical models for data from a test with potential cheating behavior. We further develop statistical decision theory for the detection of cheaters and compromised items.
Depending on the types of data that are available, two models are proposed, one for data consisting only of item-level binary scores and the other for data consisting of both item-level binary scores and response time. The latter degenerates to the former when response time information is not collected. These two types of data are commonly available in traditional paper-and-pencil testing and computer-based testing, respectively. As will be shown via our real data analysis and simulation studies, incorporating response time information improves the detection of cheaters and compromised items.
The first model can be regarded as a hybrid of two most popular models in the literature of educational measurement, factor models and latent class models. Factor models are typically referred to as item response theory (IRT) models in educational measurement. They serve as the major statistical tool for item response theory, the dominant statistical paradigm for the design, analysis, and scoring of tests (van der Linden, 2018) . Many popular standardized tests take the IRT paradigm. Following this practice, the proposed framework uses an IRT model as a baseline model to characterize item response distribution when there is no item preknowledge. In real applications, the same IRT model used by the testing program can be chosen as the baseline model. Latent class model is a family of models for learning the structure of unobserved groups from data. They have also been widely used in educational assessment (Rupp, Templin, & Henson, 2010; von Davier & Lee, 2019) and community detection in social network analysis (Holland, Laskey, & Leinhardt, 1983; Rohe, Qin, & Yu, 2016) . In the current development, a latent class model component is added upon a baseline IRT model to capture cheating behavior due to item preknowledge. More specifically, we impose latent class structures on both test takers (i.e., cheaters versus non-cheaters) and items (i.e., compromised versus noncompromised items) and model their interactive effect on item responses. Thanks to this special structure, the learning of the latent class structure in test takers and that in items borrow information from each other.
When item-level response time information is available, a similar modeling strategy is used to specify a joint model for item responses and response time. Specifically, we first take a factor model as the baseline model for the joint distribution of item responses and response time when there is no cheating. Such models have been developed in the psychometric literature for the joint modeling of item responses and response time in standardized testing; see e.g., van der Linden (2007) . We then combine the baseline model with a latent class model component to capture cheating behavior, where the interaction between the test-taker classes and the item classes is reflected in the conditional distributions of item responses and response time given the latent variables.
Making decisions for cheating detection can be very sensitive. Decisions on test takers are a trade-off between false positive errors and false negative errors, where a false positive error occurs when an innocent test taker being misclassified as a cheater and a false negative error corresponds to a failure of detecting a cheater. The consequences of the two types of errors are usually asymmetric and depend largely on the course of action taken following the decision (see Skorupski & Wainer, 2017 , for a detailed discussion). For example, a false positive may be more severe if the test taker will be forbidden to take a liscensing test again once being classified as a cheater, because such a decision may block him/her from taking a certain career. For another example, a false negative may be more serious if a medical student passes a medical board examination by cheating and becomes a surgeon. Decisions of removing potentially compromised items are also a trade-off between false positives and false negatives, where a false positive corresponds to a noncompromised item being removed and a false negative corresponds to a compromised item not being removed. The first type of error results in a financial cost for new item development and the second type of error threatens test fairness.
This problem can be viewed as a multiple hypothesis testing problem, where each test taker/item is associated with a null hypothesis of the test taker not cheating/the item not compromised. The two types of errors here are essentially the type I and type II errors of hypothesis testing. False discovery rate (FDR) control provides a useful framework for large-scale multiple testing when the number of hypotheses is large (Efron, 2012) . This framework leads to compound decision rules (Robbins, 1951; Zhang, 2003) for which information on other hypotheses is taken into account in testing each individual hypothesis. Many approaches have been developed under this framework, including the well-known Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) and the local FDR control procedure (Efron, 2004 (Efron, , 2008 (Efron, , 2012 Efron, Tibshirani, Storey, & Tusher, 2001) , where the former is a frequentist approach and the latter is developed under a Bayesian or empirical Bayesian framework. In this paper, we take a full Bayesian framework and develop compound decision rules based on the concepts of local false discovery rate and local false nondiscovery rate (Efron, 2012) . A Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm is developed for the computation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose two statistical models for cheating detection, one for item response data and the other for item response and response time data. Under a Bayesian framework, statistical decision theory is developed in Section 3 based on the proposed models. Bayesian inference procedures are developed in Section 4. The proposed method is applied to a real dataset from a licensure test in Section 5. We end with concluding remarks in Section 6. The supplementary material contains the proof of a theoretical result, details of the proposed MCMC algorithms, and an extensive simulation study.
Proposed Cheating Detection Models

Cheating Detection based on Item Responses
We first consider detecting cheating based on item responses from a single test administration. Consider N individuals taking a test with J items. Let Y ij be a random variable, denoting test taker i's response to item j. We consider binary scores, where Y ij = 1 if the corresponding response is a correct answer and Y ij = 0 if it is incorrect. We denote
as the response vector of test taker i and denote Y = (Y ij ) N ×J as the response matrix. For ease of exposition, we assume the test is designed to measure a single construct. We let θ i be a person-specific parameter, denoting test taker i's ability measured by the test. In addition, we use a binary variable ξ i to indicate whether test taker i is a cheater, where ξ i = 1 indicates cheating and ξ i = 0 otherwise. Similarly, let η j be another binary variable, where η j = 1 indicates that the item is compromised and η j = 0 otherwise.
The cheating indicators impose latent class structures in both test takers and items. All the θ i s, ξ i s, and η j s are unknown and will be estimated from data, together with other unknown parameters.
Baseline model. We first consider a baseline IRT model when there is no cheating, i.e., ξ i = 0. For simplicity, here we adopt the Rasch model (Rasch, 1960) as the baseline model, for which the item response function (IRF) takes the form
where β j is known as the difficulty parameter which characterizes the difficulty level of the item. Further assumptions on this baseline model will be discussed below when the proposed model is formally described. We emphasize that the Rasch model can be easily replaced by other IRT models in the proposed framework, such as the two-parameter logistic model (Birnbaum, 1968 ) and non-parametric IRT models (Ramsay & Abrahamowicz, 1989) .
Proposed model We add an additional component upon the baseline IRT model given in
(1) to capture cheating, where cheating behavior is modeled by an interaction of the cheating indicators ξ i and δ j . More precisely, we assume the following IRF
where δ is an additional positive parameter capturing the effect of cheating and Θ i = (θ i , ξ i ) and ∆ j = (β j , η j ) are taken as generic notations for the person-and item-specific parameters, respectively. This model assumes that test takers who cheat will cheat on all compromised items. Specifically, the IRF (2) goes back to the baseline model (1) if either the test taker i is not a cheater (i.e. ξ i = 0) or the item j is non-compromised (i.e. η j = 0). In this situation, the log-odds of a correct response is θ i − β j . When the test taker is a cheater (i.e. ξ i = 1) and the item is compromised (i.e. η j = 1), then the IRF still takes a Rasch form but the log-odds of a correct response becomes θ i − β j + δ, which is larger than the baseline by a positive constant δ. Local independence is assumed; that is, Y ij s are conditionally independent across all test takers and items, given the drift parameter δ and all the person-and item-specific parameters Θ i and ∆ j , i = 1, ..., N, j = 1, ..., J.
We further adopt a Bayesian hierarchical latent variable modeling framework which assumes that δ, Θ i , and ∆ j are all random variables. As we will see in Section 3, a compound decision theory is established under this Bayesian framework. Specifically, we let Θ i , i = 1, ..., N , be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples from distribution g 1 (Θ|ν 1 ) and ∆ j , j = 1, ..., J, be i.i.d. samples from distribution g 2 (∆|ν 2 ), respectively, where g 1 and g 2 characterize the population of test takers and the domain of items, respectively. Here, we assume both distributions are parametric and use ν 1 and ν 2 as generic notations for the hyper-parameters of the two distributions, respectively. Figure 1 provides The specification of g 1 and g 2 , and the priors for ν 1 , ν 2 , and δ will be discussed in Section 4.1.
Cheating Detection based on Item Responses and Response Time
We now extend the previous model to testing data consisting of both item responses and response time. The proposed submodel for response time takes into account that a test taker tends to answer more quickly when he/she has preknowledge about an item (van der Linden, 2009).
Baseline model. We start with a baseline model for the joint modeling of item responses and response time. Let T ij denote the amount of time test taker i spends to answer item j and T = (T ij ) denote the response time matrix. The baseline model specifies the distribution of (Y ij , T ij ) when there is no cheating.
For the modeling of response time, we introduce a parameter τ i ∈ R as a person-specific speed factor. A larger value of τ i indicates that the test taker performs faster in general.
More specifically, the following log-normal model is assumed as the baseline response time model,
where the item-specific parameter α j captures the mean time for completing the item in log-scale and the variance term κ captures the variation in the response time across test takers. In addition, the binary item responses Y ij are still modelled with (1), assuming that the distribution of Y ij only depends on the parameters in (1), and does not depend on the person-and item-specific parameters to be introduced in the conditional model for response time.
In the baseline model, Y ij and T ij are assumed to be conditionally independent given θ i , τ i , β j , α j , κ, δ, and γ. The marginal dependence between Y ij and T ij will be introduced by the dependence between the ability and speed factors θ i and τ i , and the dependence between the item characteristics β j and α j , details of which can be found in Section 4.1.
Note that this baseline model takes a similar form as the hierarchical model of van der Linden (2007) for the joint modeling of item responses and response times. The response time submodel (3) can be easily generalized (e.g., Loeys, Rosseel, & Baten, 2011; van der Linden, 2007; Wang, Chang, & Douglas, 2013) .
Proposed model. The proposed model based on item responses and response time is an extension of model M 1 and it degenerates to M 1 when response time information is missing completely at random. Specifically, the same IRF as in (2) is assumed. In addition, on the basis of baseline model (3), we introduce the submodel for response time
where ξ i and η j are the cheating indicators for test takers and items, respectively, and γ is a positive drift parameter, characterizing the reduction in time due to item preknowledge.
If either the test taker i is not a cheater (i.e. ξ i = 0) or the item j is non-compromised (i.e. η j = 0), then both the item response submodel and the response time submodel degenerate to the corresponding baseline models. On the other hand, when the test taker is a cheater (i.e., ξ i = 1) and the item is compromised (i.e., δ j = 1), the mean log-time reduces to α j − τ i − γ and the log-odds of a correct response increases to θ i − β j + δ. Note that the item response submodel and the response time submodel share the same cheating indicators ξ i and η j . Local independence is assumed, which says that the 2N J random variables Y ij ,
.., N, j = 1, ..., J, are conditionally independent, given δ, γ, κ, and all the personand item-specific parameters, (θ i , ξ i , τ i ) and (β j , η j , α j ), j = 1, ..., J, i = 1, ..., N .
With slight abuse of notation, we still use Θ i and ∆ j to denote the person-and itemspecific parameters, respectively, with Θ i = (θ i , ξ i , τ i ) and ∆ j = (β j , η j , α j ). A hierarchical modeling framework is still adopted, in which δ, γ, κ, Θ i , and ∆ j are regarded as random variables. We assume Θ i , i = 1, ..., N , are i.i.d. and ∆ j , j = 1, ..., J, are i.i.d., following two distributions, respectively. With more abuse of notation, we denote the two distributions by g 1 (Θ|ν 1 ) and g 2 (∆|ν 2 ) and use ν 1 and ν 2 as the generic notations for the hyper-parameters in the model. This model is visualized in Figure 2 and is referred to as model M 2 in the rest. The specification of g 1 and g 2 , and the priors for ν 1 , ν 2 , δ, γ, and κ for this model will be discussed in Section 4.1.
Related Models and Extensions
Our problem can be viewed as an outlier detection problem for multivariate data, when viewing cheaters and compromised items as outliers. From this perspective, the goal is to simultaneously detect outliers in rows and columns of a N × J data matrix. The proposed models can be viewed as an extension of the mean-shift model for outlier detection and robust estimation in regression setting (Kong, Bondell, & Wu, 2018; McCann & Welsch, 2007; She & Owen, 2011) to a non-linear factor model setting.
The proposed model is also closely related to mixed Rasch models (Rost, 1990 ; Rost in both test takers and items. As a result, the proposed method allows us to simultaneously detect cheaters and compromised items, while the former does not.
We further remark that the proposed modeling framework is quite general, though specific forms are assumed in models M 1 and M 2 . The key idea is to impose latent class structures on both test takers and items, on top of a factor model for capturing normal item response behavior. Taking this idea, the baseline models in M 1 and M 2 can be easily replaced by more complex models, as discussed previously. The proposed model can also be extended to testing data with polytomous item-level scores or tests designed to measure multiple constructs. The former can be handled by replacing the baseline IRT model by IRT models for polytomous items (see e.g., Chapter 5, Bartholomew, Knott, & Moustaki, 2011) and the latter can be handled by specifying a multidimensional IRT model (Reckase, 2009 ) as the baseline model.
Finally, we point out that the latent class component for cheating can be further generalized. In the current models, a test taker either has preknowledge on all the compromised items or none of the compromised items. In addition, the effect of cheating is assumed to be the same across different cheaters and compromised items, characterized by parameters δ and γ in the item response submodel and the response time submodel, respectively. These assumptions can be generalized. For the former, we may consider multiple latent classes for cheaters and compromised items, respectively, when there are multiple "sources" of item leakage and cheaters may have access to one or multiple sources of leaked items. For the latter, it is possible to allow δ and γ to be person-and/or item-specific under a Bayesian hierarchical latent variable modeling framework.
Statistical Decision Theory for Cheating Detection
Making formal decisions in cheating detection is often sensitive and high-stake. In what follows, we provide a statistical decision framework that takes into account the special features of the problem. Under a full Bayesian framework, the proposed decision rules rely on the posterior probabilities of the cheating indicators, ξ i and η j . For real-life problems where both N and J are large, these posterior probabilities cannot be computed analytically. In that case, we make decision based on approximated posterior probabilities given by MCMC samples.
Bayesian Decision for Cheater Detection
We denote D i as the decision on test taker i, where D i = 1 means flagging the test taker as a cheater and D i = 0 otherwise. Then a false positive happens when D i = 1 and ξ i = 0 and a false negative happens when D i = 0 and ξ i = 1. As mentioned previously, decisions on the detection of cheaters involve trade-off between these two types of errors, whose importance is usually asymmetric. Suppose the relative cost of a false positive is ∈ (0, 1) and that of Not flagged as cheater Flagged as cheater Total Noncheater N 00 
Following Bayesian decision theory, the optimal decision rule which minimizes the Bayes risk is to classify based on the posterior distribution. That is, under model M 1 , we should let
Compound Decision for Cheater Detection
In practice, however, the relative costs of false positive and false negative are usually hard to
specify. An alternative is to make a compound decision based on information from all test takers. We consider the situation where the consequence of false positives is more severe than that of false negatives. Given a decision rule, the results can be summarized by Table 1 , where N 00 , N 01 , N 10 , and N 11 denote the numbers of true negative, false positive, false negative, and true positive, respectively. Then one quantity that the decision maker would like to control is the false positive proportion N 01 / max {N ·1 , 1}, which is the proportion of innocent test takers among the detections. The denominator is chosen so that this proportion is welldefined even when N ·1 = 0. For ease of exposition, the following discussion is under model We formalize this idea by controlling a local False Discovery Rate (FDR), which is defined as the posterior expectation of the false positive proportion; see Efron (2008) for a detailed discussion. Specifically, we consider a specific family of decision rules, for which the decision on each test taker i is given by thresholding the posterior probability, i.e.,
for some threshold ζ. Following our previous discussion, this decision is an optimal individual decision that minimizes Bayesian risk (5), when the relative cost of false positive is ζ. Under the full Bayesian setting and given threshold ζ, the local FDR becomes
which only depends on the posterior probabilities P (ξ i = 1|Y), i = 1, ..., N . The local False Nondiscovery Rate (FNR), which is defined as the posterior mean of N 10 /N ·0 , can be obtained similarly
.
Then the optimal ζ is given by the following proposition that controls the local FDR to be below a certain pre-specified level ρ (e.g., ρ = 1%) and in the meantime minimizes the local FNR.
Proposition 1. Given data matrix Y, the local FDR fdr ζ (Y) as a function of ζ is nonincreasing and left continuous, and the local FNR fnr ζ (Y) is nondecreasing in ζ. Then
In other words, given a model and item response matrix Y, the optimal decision which solves (9) is D i (ζ * (Y; ρ)), i = 1, ..., N , among the class of decision rules (6). The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix A.
We remark that an alternative criterion to false discovery rate control is familywise error rate control, which tends to be more conservative. For educational tests with thousands or even hundreds of thousands of test takers, the controlling of familywise error rate can result in extremely low detection power, making it less useful in practice. On the other hand, the false discovery rate control criterion is more scalable to tests of different sizes.
Similar as above, if false negatives have a more significant consequence than the false positives, then a better idea may be to control the local FNR to be below a certain level and in the meantime to minimize the local FDR. As the definitions of local FDR and local FNR are mathematically symmetric, the procedure described above can be easily modified for this criterion.
Detection of Compromised Items
Decisions also need to be made for items. When there is sufficient evidence suggesting that an item is compromised, then we want to remove it from the item pool to maintain the quality of the pool. As mentioned earlier, this decision problem faces the trade-off between the financial cost for item pool replenishment and the need of maintaining the quality of the item pool. We make two remarks.
First, the Bayesian decision framework is still suitable here for handling the trade-off.
Similar as in Section 3.1, by setting relative costs of a false positive (i.e., a noncompromised item flagged as compromised) and a false negative (i.e., failing to flag a compromised item), a Bayes risk can be defined and the corresponding optimal decision can be obtained based on the posterior distribution P
Second, compound decision rule can also be developed. Here, a false negative error results in the use of a leaked item in tests, which tends to be more detrimental than a false positive one for the testing industry. It is thus sensible to control the false negative proportion which is the proportion of compromised items in the remaining ones. Then similar to the developments in Section 3.2, local FDR and local FNR can be defined for the compound decision on items and a similar procedure can be developed that controls local FNR to be below a given threshold (e.g., 1%) and in the meantime minimizes the local FDR. The priors and hyper-priors for model M 1 can be obtained by marginalizing out the unique parameters in M 2 .
We start with the specification of g 1 , the joint distribution of Θ i = (θ i , ξ i , τ i ). First, it is assumed that (θ i , τ i ) follows a bivariate normal distribution N (0, Σ), where Σ = (σ ij ) 2×2 .
Second, we let the cheating indicator ξ i be independent of (θ i , τ i ) and follow a Bernoulli distribution, Bern(π 1 ). Note that a person's ability and speed are typically correlated, which is why we assume a bivariate normal distribution for (θ i , τ i ). Similar settings are adopted in existing models for item responses and response time; see e.g., van der Linden (2007).
We then specify g 2 , the joint distribution of ∆ j = (β j , η j , α j ). Similar to that of g 1 , we first let (β j , α j ) follow a bivariate normal distribution N (µ, Ω), where µ = (µ 1 , µ 2 ) and Ω = (ω ij ) 2×2 . We further assume that η j is an independent Bernoulli random variable, Bern(π 2 ).
It remains to specify the prior for positive parameters δ, γ, κ, as well as the priors for hyper-parameters π 1 , π 2 , µ 1 , µ 2 , Ω, and Σ.
1. As δ is positive, we assume a Gamma distribution with shape parameter 2 and rate parameter 0.5, Gamma(2, 0.5).
2. Similarly, γ is assumed to follow the same Gamma distribution, Gamma(2, 0.5).
3. κ is assumed to follow an inverse Gamma distribution, IG(1, 1), where the shape and scale parameters are both set to 1.
4. π 1 and π 2 are assumed to be i.i.d., following a beta distribution with both shape parameters being 2, Beta(2, 2).
5. µ 1 and µ 2 are assumed to be i.i.d., following a normal distribution N (0, 5 2 ). 1. For Θ i = (θ i , ξ i ), θ i and ξ i are independent, following normal distribution N (0, σ 11 ) and Bernoulli distribution Bern(π 1 ), respectively.
2. Similarly, for ∆ j = (β j , η j ), β j and η j are independent, following normal distribution N (µ 1 , ω 11 ) and Bernoulli distribution Bern(π 2 ), respectively.
3. δ follows a Gamma prior, Gamma(2, 0.5).
4. π 1 and π 2 are i.i.d., following Beta(2, 2). 5. µ 1 follows a normal distribution N (0, 5 2 ).
6. σ 11 and ω 11 are i.i.d. IG(1, 1) .
This completes the specification of the priors and hyper-priors for model M 1 .
Bayesian Inference
Computation Comparison of models. We further address the following questions by model comparison.
Does our item response data show evidence of cheating? If so, does item response time information help detect cheating?
We address the first question by comparing model M 1 with a null model, where the null model is the same as model M 1 except for assuming a baseline IRF (i.e., ξ i = 0 and δ j = 0, for all i and j). This null model is referred to as model M 0 1 in the rest. We compare the two models by the deviance information criterion (DIC; Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & Van Der Linde, 2002) , which can be easily computed using MCMC. If M 1 is preferred to M 0 1 , then it implies that a baseline IRT model is not sufficient and cheating due to item preknowledge is likely to exist in the data.
To address the second question, we compare model M 2 with a null model which has the same specification as model M 2 except that its submodel for response time is a baseline model without a cheating component. That is, in the null model,
This null model is referred to as model M 0 2 in the rest. If model M 2 is preferred to the null model, it suggests that response time contains information about the cheating indicators and thus incorporating response time information should facilitate cheating detection. Again, we use DIC for model comparison.
Case Study: Credentialing Dataset
We apply the proposed method to a dataset from a computer-based non-adaptive licensure test. This dataset has also been analyzed in several chapters of Cizek and Wollack (2017) and journal articles including Sinharay (2017a) and Sinharay (2017b The testing program flagged 41 among the 1624 test takers as likely cheaters, through a combination of data analysis and a careful investigative process which brought in other pieces of information. By a similar investigation process, the testing program also believed that 64 among the 170 items were compromised. These labels will be used as partial truth for validating our data analysis results, though they are not directly incorporated into our model. It is worth noting that these labels are not the ground truth and it is very likely that a substantial proportion of cheaters and compromised items were missed by the testing program. 
Descriptive Analysis
We start with descriptive analysis results to give an overview of the dataset. Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows the histogram of test takers' total scores by the testing program's cheating labels. Similarly, Panel (b) of Figure 3 gives the histogram of items' correct rates by the testing program's compromisation labels. Similarly, the two panels of Figure 4 show the histograms of mean response time in the logarithm scale for test takers and items, respectively.
From these plots, it is not difficult to see that the corresponding summary statistics do not have much information about the labels of the test takers and items. In fact, the area under the curves (AUC) of the corresponding ROC curves are 55.2% and 71.7% for the classification of the cheating labels based on total score and mean log-time, respectively. Similarly, the corresponding AUCs for the classification of items are 52.4% and 60.6%, respectively. As we will see in the sequel, the proposed models substantially improve upon these benchmarks. 
Detection based on Item Responses
We apply model M 1 to the item responses in the dataset. Using the algorithm given in Appendix B, 100 MCMC chains were run with random starting points. Their convergence was assessed by traceplots and the Gelman and Rubin diagnostic statistic (Gelman & Rubin, 1992 ). Among the 100 chains, 13 chains converged and Figure 5 shows the traceplot of deviance for these chains after their convergence. The rest of the chains failed to converge after 13,000 iterations and thus are not used in our analysis. Note that slow mixing is a common issue for MCMC algorithms when there are discrete parameters (e.g., Richardson & Green, 1997) , especially when the number of discrete parameters is large.
Inference is drawn based on 65,000 posterior samples from the 13 converged chains, where each chain contributes 5,000 samples. We first compare models exist among the test takers.
We then examine the classification results. Panel (a) of Figure 6 gives the boxplots of the posterior means of ξ i for the cheating and non-cheating groups (defined by the testing program), respectively. As we can see, the posterior means of ξ i for the cheating group tend to be close to 1 and those for the non-cheating group tend to be close to 0, with a small number of exceptions. Panel (b) of Figure 6 gives boxplots of the posterior means of η j for the compromised and non-compromised items, respectively. Similarly, the posterior means of η j for the compromised items tend to be close to 1 and those for the non-compromised items tend to be close to 0. The corresponding ROC curves for the classification of the cheating and compromisation labels are presented in Figure 7 . The AUCs for these two ROC curves are 0.917 and 0.846, respectively. They are substantially larger than the ones given by the summary statistics discussed in Section 5.1.
Moreover, Panel (a) of Figure 8 shows the local FDR and the local FNR as functions of the number of detections, respectively, when applying the proposed compound decision rule to test takers. As we can see, as the number of detections increases, the local FDR increases and the local FNR decreases. The same plot for items is given in Panel (b) of Figure 8 .
Specifically, the numbers of detections under different thresholds are given in Table 2 , where we control local FDR for test takers and control local FNR for items. Finally, posterior means and 95% credible intervals of the global parameters are presented in Table 3 , where the global parameters refer to the parameters that are not person-specific or item-specific. In particular, the posterior mean of the proportion of cheaters is 2.1%, with 95% credible interval (1.9%, 3.2%). This estimate is close to the proportion of 2.5% based on the cheating labels from the testing program. The posterior mean of the proportion of compromised items is 40.5%, with 95% credible interval (36.9%, 43.7%). This estimate is close to, but slightly higher than the proportion of 37.6% given by the testing program. It suggests that the testing program may have missed several compromised items during its labeling process. Furthermore, the posterior mean of δ is 0.904. That is, the odds ratio of correctly answering a compromised item is about exp(0.904) = 2.5 when comparing a cheater and a non-cheater with the same ability level. Table 3 : Applying model M 1 to credentialing dataset. The row labelled "EAP" shows the posterior means of the global parameters, where EAP represents for Expected A Posteriori, and the row labelled "95% CI" provides the corresponding 95% credible intervals.
Detection based on Item Responses and Response Time
We further apply model M 2 to the dataset consisting of both item responses and response time. We ran 13 MCMC chains, for which the starting points for the M 2 unique parameters were chosen randomly and the common parameters shared with model M 1 were taken from the mixed chains for model M 1 above. All the 13 chains converged after 13,000 steps based on the same convergence criteria as above. Table 5: Applying model M 2 to credentialing dataset. The row labelled "EAP" shows the posterior means of the global parameters and the row labelled "95% CI" provides the corresponding 95% credible intervals. parameters shared by the two models are close to each other. In particular, the 95% credit intervals overlap for each parameter. In addition, based on the posterior mean of Σ, the correlation between the ability and speed factors is as high as 0.442. This result indicates that test takers with higher ability tend to answer the items faster. Such a high correlation between the two factors is not uncommon for high-stake tests. For example, Wang et al. (2013) report a similar level of correlation between the ability and speed factors in a highstake computerized adaptive test, under a similar Bayesian hierarchical model but without a cheating component. The estimated correlation between the two item-specific parameters is 0.190. This positive correlation suggests that solving more difficult items tends to take more time, which is consistent with our intuition.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we propose statistical models for the simultaneous detection of cheaters and compromised items in tests. The proposed models can be regarded as a hybrid of factor models and latent class models, two families of statistical models widely used in the design and analysis of educational tests. Under the proposed framework, compound decision theory is proposed for the detection of cheaters and compromised items under a Bayesian decision framework. Statistical inference is carried out under a full Bayesian framework for which MCMC algorithms are developed. The proposed method requires little prior knowledge about the test takers and items. It is thus directly applicable to operational tests as a monitoring tool. The proposed models are successfully applied to data from a licensure test which suffers from the item preknowledge issue. Specifically, the proposed models accurately detect the potential cheaters and compromised items identified by the testing program.
Despite its flexibility, usefulness, and good performance on real data, the proposed method has some limitations. One limitation lies in its computation. It is observed that our random scan MH-within-Gibbs algorithm can sometimes suffer from convergence issues, which is likely due to the presence of many discrete latent variables. In fact, this is a common issue for Gibbs algorithms for mixture models (e.g., Richardson & Green, 1997) . MCMC algorithms with better convergence performance are worth future development.
Another limitation of the proposed method is that it only models a specific type of cheating, i.e., item preknowledge due to the leakage of items. It does not handle other types of cheating behaviors, such as copying others' answers, electronic transmission of data, hiring stand-ins, and bribing test administrators to correct one's answers. In fact, to investigate different types of cheating behaviors, different sources of information are needed and suitable statistical methods remain to be developed. For example, to detect copying behavior, a statistical model is needed to characterize the similarity between the item responses from two test takers, possibly taking into account their response process information (e.g., response time), seat locations in a test center, etc. We leave these problems for future investigation.
It is worth pointing out that the proposed modeling and inference framework has other applications. In fact, the simultaneous detection of cheaters and compromised items can be viewed as a special case of the general problem of latent differential item functioning (DIF) analysis (Cho, Suh, & Lee, 2016; De Boeck, Cho, & Wilson, 2011) and our proposed methods can be extended to the general problem. Latent DIF analysis is an important complement to DIF analysis for the evaluation of test validity. Latent DIF analysis focuses on finding unknown subsets of items on which there are latent groups of test takers who perform differently (advantaged versus disadvantaged) after controlling for the ability to be measured by the test. Unlike in the cheating detection problem where item differential functioning is due to item preknowledge, there could be more causes of latent DIF, resulting in a more complex latent structure. Besides educational testing, the proposed framework may also be useful in the detection of fraudulent review/rating data from online shopping, video sharing, and restaurant rating websites, where similar detection problems exist.
The current work can be further extended along several directions. First, more information may be incorporated into the detection of cheating, such as person-and item-specific characteristics. For example, the education record of a test taker may be powerful in predicting cheating and the exposure rate of an item is a good predictor of its leakage. Such information may be incorporated into the current model under a structural equation modeling framework that will allow covariates to be incorporated into the model to improve its detection power. Second, the current developments can be extended to the detection of cheating based on data from sequential administrations of a test, where each item in the item pool may appear in multiple test administrations and a test taker may also take the test more than once. Comparing with data from a single test administration, more information accumulates in data from multiple administrations. In the meantime, the statistical decision also becomes sequential. For example, the detection of a compromised item may be formulated as a multi-stream sequential change point detection problem (Chen & Li, 2019) , where each item is associated with a change point (i.e., time point of leakage). For such a problem, compound decision rules balancing detection delay and false alarms need further development.
Finally, we point out that test fairness is becoming more and more important in our education system and methods for detecting cheating in tests are of great need. The sensitivity and high-stakeness of the problem impose special requirements on quantitative methods for cheating detection, including the accuracy, unbiasedness, and interpretability of the detection results. Statistical models and decision theory have a unique strength in addressing these issues and should play a more important role.
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We let p (1) < · · · < p (n) ∈ (0, 1) be all the distinct values for P (ξ i = 1|Y), i = 1, ..., N , where n is less than or equal to N as there might be ties. We further let p (0) = 0 and p (n+1) = 1. Then by the form of local FDR in (7), it is easy to verify that fdr ζ (Y ) is a step function of ζ, where fdr ζ (Y ) is a constant in interval [p (t−1) , p (t) ), for any t = 1, ..., n + 1.
Therefore, fdr ζ (Y ) is left continuous in ζ.
We further show that fdr ζ (Y ) > fdr ζ (Y ), when ζ ∈ [p (t−1) , p (t) ) and ζ ∈ [p (t) , p (t+1) ), for any t = 1, ..., n. When t < n, we have
it is easy to see that fdr ζ (Y) > fdr ζ (Y) as fdr ζ (Y) = 0. This completes the proof for the properties of fdr ζ (Y ). The proof for the nondecreasing property of fnr ζ (Y) is similar and thus is omitted here.
By the left-continuity of fdr ζ (Y), we have Therefore, ζ * (Y; ρ) solves the optimization problem (9).
B A Random Scan MetropolisHastings within Gibbs
Algorithm Random scan MH-within-Gibbs MCMC algorithms are developed for the computation, where a random scan step is taken to improve the mixing of the algorithm. The algorithm for model M 1 is described below.
Algorithm 1 (Random Scan MH-within-Gibbs Algorithm for M 1 ).
δ 0 , ν 0 1 = (π 0 1 , σ 0 11 ), and ν 0 2 = (π 0 2 , µ 0 1 , ω 0 11 ), burn-in size m 1 , and total number of iterations m 2 .
Iterations: In each iteration t, t = 1, 2, ..., m 2 , we update each of the 10 parameter blocks, given the current parameters in the rest of the blocks. A random scan step is taken, so that the order in which the blocks are updated is random. The update method for each of the blocks is described below.
Block 1: Update θ t i s by a random walk MH step given the current parameter values, where the random walk follows a mean zeron Gaussian distribution. Given our model structure, the updates are independent for i = 1, ..., N , and thus can be computed in parallel.
Block 2: Update ξ t i s by a Gibbs step given the current parameter values. Note that given the other parameters, ξ i , i = 1, ..., N , are conditionally independent.
Therefore, ξ t i s are updated by sampling from N independent Bernoulli distributions.
Block 3: Update β t j s by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current parameter values. Similar as in Step 1, the updates are independent for j = 1, ..., J.
Block 4: Update η t j s by a Gibbs step given the current parameter values. Similar to Step 2, η t j s are updated by sampling from J independent Bernoulli distributions.
Block 5: Update δ t by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current parameter values.
Block 6: Update π 1 by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current parameter values. Negative samples are automatically rejected.
Block 7: Update σ t 11 by a Gibbs step given the current parameter values. The conditional distribution of σ 11 is still inverse gamma,
Block 8: Update π 2 by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current parameter values. Negative samples are automatically rejected. Block 10: Update ω t 11 by a Gibbs step given the current parameter values. The conditional distribution of ω 11 is still inverse gamma,
The algorithm for model M 2 is described below that extends Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 (Random Scan MH-within-Gibbs Algorithm for M 2 ).
Block 8: Update γ t by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current parameter values.
Block 9: Update κ t by a Gibbs step. The conditional distribution of κ is still inverse gamma,
Block 10: Update π 1 by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current parameter values. Negative samples are automatically rejected.
Block 11: Update Σ t by a Gibbs step given the current parameter values. The condi- 
Setting π 1 π 2 N J S1
10% 25% 2000 200  S2  20% 50% 2000 200  S3 10% 25% 4000 400 S4 20% 50% 4000 400 
C Simulation Study
C.1 Settings
We provide a simulation study to assess the performance of the proposed models. Our simulations are designed to mimic real-life situations. In particular, we consider two combinations of the proportions of cheaters and compromised items, including (1) π 1 = 10% and π 2 = 25%, and (2) π 1 = 20% and π 2 = 50%, where the second setting corresponds to a more severe situation with larger proportions of cheaters and compromised items. In addition, we consider two combinations of sample size N and item size J, including (1) N = 2000, J = 200, and (2) N = 4000, J = 400. This leads to four simulation settings, as listed in Table 6 .
Among these settings, S1 is the least informative one, given the relatively smaller N and J and the imbalance in both the test taker population and the item domain, while S4 is the most informative setting.
For each setting, we generate 50 independent datasets, where each dataset is generated under model M 2 with its global parameters fixed constant across replications. In particular, settings of the proportion parameters π 1 and π 2 are given above, the drift parameters δ and γ are both set to be 1.2, and the rest of the global parameters are set to be the same as the posterior means in Table 5 from the real data analysis in Section 5. For each dataset, we apply the proposed models M 1 and M 2 , where M 1 is fitted to the subset of data consisting only of item responses.
C.2 Results
To focus on the evaluation of the proposed models and statistical decision theory, we use the true parameters as the starting point of the MCMC algorithm. This tends to avoid the convergence issue of the MCMC algorithm that is observed in the real data analysis. For each dataset, we run 5,000 iterations, with the first 3,000 iterations as the burn-in. The results are based on the posterior samples from the last 2,000 iterations.
We first examine the classification results. For each model and each simulated dataset, we classify the test takers based on the posterior means of ξ i and evaluate the performance of the classification based on the AUC value of the corresponding ROC curve. Similarly, the classification of the items is based on the posterior means of η j and its quality is also measured by the corresponding AUC value. These results are shown in Figure 9 . For each of the two models, the best classification performance is observed under the most informative setting S 4 , and the worst performance is observed under the least informative setting S 1 . In addition, the AUC values given by model M 2 tend to be slightly larger than those obtained from model M 1 , which is likely due to that model M 2 makes use of more information.
We then evaluate the proposed compound decision rules. For each dataset, we control local FDR at levels 1%, 5%, and 10% for test takers, and control local FNR at the same thresholds for items. Then we examine the false discovery proportion for test takers and the false non-discovery proportion for items. The results are presented in Figures 10 and 11 (f) Figure 10 : Simulation study: Results under model M 1 on the false discovery proportions for test takers and the false nondiscovery proportions for items when applying the proposed compound decision rules. Panels (a) -(c) show the results for test takers when controlling local FDR at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively and Panels (d) -(f) show the results for items when controlling local FNR at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. For each panel, the corresponding threshold (1%/5%/10%) is marked using a red dashed line.
models M 1 and M 2 , respectively. As we can see, except for the least informative setting S1, the proposed method reasonably controls the false discovery proportion and the false non-discovery proportion to be around or slightly below the targeted values, for test takers and items, respectively. These proportions are not accurately controlled under setting S1, which is likely due to the inaccurate estimation and classification under this setting.
Finally, we present results on parameter estimation. Figures 12-14 show the bias of the posterior mean estimates for the global parameters under models M 1 and M 2 , respectively.
For each global parameter in each model, we present the bias of its posterior mean estimate by boxplot. In general, the bias tends to be around zero for all the global parameters in the two models. In addition, for each of the two models, the parameter estimates tend to be most accurate under setting S4 and least accurate under setting S1. Figure 11 : Simulation study: Results under model M 2 on the false discovery proportions for test takers and the false nondiscovery proportions for items when applying the proposed compound decision rules. Panels (a) -(c) show the results for test takers when controlling local FDR at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively and Panels (d) -(f) show the results for items when controlling local FNR at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. For each panel, the corresponding threshold (1%/5%/10%) is marked using a red dashed line. 
